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RECENT CASES.
COMMON CARRIERS.
Damaged Goods-Liability of Carriers.-Morganton Mfg. Co. v. Ohio
R. and C. Ry. Co., 28 S. E. Rep. (N. C.) 474. Where defendant's agent re-
ceived a box of goods which had been shipped over several connecting lines,
and marked the bill of lading "0. K.," and the goods are found to be damaged
at the end of the line, a rebuttable presumption arises that they were injured
after they were thus received. If the contents of the box were unknown to
the defendant, liability could have been guarded against by examination or
stipulation, and failure to do so was negligence (Dixon v. Railroad, 74 N. C. 538).
Telegrafih Comanies-Rules-Effect on Receiver of Telegramn-Pre-
sentation of Claim.- Webb v. Western Union Tel. Co., 48 N. E. Rep. (Ill.)
670. A rule of a telegraph company printed upon the back of the telegram,
requiring all claims for damages to be presented within sixty days is not bind-
ing upon the receiver of telegram in the absence of proof that he assented
thereto. And where the action is one sounding in tort for a mistake in trans-
mitting the telegram the mere knowledge of such a rule by the receiver will
not affect his right to recover. While there may be a contract relation between
the sender of the message and the company which under proper condition will
bind the sender, there is no contract relation between the receiver and
the company, and his proper remedy for damages for its alteration is an action
in tort (Telegra,6h Co. v. Fairbanks, 15 Ill. App. 6oo). As the receiver's
remedy is in tort, the company cannot compel a claim for loss to be
made in any particular time. As a general rule an action for tort can be
brought within any time allotted by the statute of limitations (Gray on Com-
munication by Telegraph, § 75; Telegrafih Co. v. Underwood, 37 Ndb. 315).
Carriers-Cars for Colored Passengers.-Louisville and N. R. Co. v.
Catrow, 43 S. W. Rep. (Ky.) 443. Section 8oi of the separate coach laws (Act
May 24, 1892) reading, "The provisions of this act shall not apply to * * *
officers in charge of prisoners," construed as an exception in favor of the
officer and not of the prisoner; and therefore no action will lie against the rail-
road in favor of an officer, because a colored prisoner whom he was'transport-
ing was obliged by the conductor to occupy the coach reserved for colored
people, thereby necessitating the officer's presence in that coach in order to
guard his prisoner.
Railroads-Transfiortation Facilities-Discriminations.-Little Rock
and Ft..S. Ry. Co. et al. v. Ofifienheimer et al., 43 S. W. Rep. (Ark.) i5o. In
a year when the crop and shipments of cotton were unusually large appellant
railway company furnished sufficient cars at certain points on its route where
there were competing lines and superior advantages for shipment to carry all
cotton offered, but at certain intermediate points failed to furnish cars suffi-
cient to ship cotton as fast as it was offered. Act of March 24, X887, sec i, pro-
vides that "All individuals, associationq and corporations shall have equal
rights to have persons and property transported over railroads in this State,
and no unjust or undue discrimination shall be made in charges for, or in facili-
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ties for, transportation of freight or passengers within the State," etc., and
section 4 provides that no discrimination in charges or facilities for transporta-
tion shall be made between individuals and transportation companies, by any
means, nor shall any preferences be made in furnishing cars and motive power,
etc. For violations of these sections a penalty is prescribed (see. 12), which
may be recovered by civil action by the party aggrieved. Held, the facts did
not show such an unjust discrimination as to subject the company to the
penalty at the suit of a shipper. So long as all the individuals at any given
station are treated alike there can be no discrimination within the meaning of
the act. The dissenting opinio.n maintains, however, that there is nothing in
the act limiting the discrimination to individuals. See Chicago and A. R.
Co. v. Peofile, 67 Ill. IM.
EVIDENCE.
Evidence-Coroner's Verdict-4ife Insurance-Suicide.-Germania Life
Ins. Co. v. Ross-Lewin et al., 51 Pac. Rep. (C01)488. In an action to recover
upon an insurance policy, held, that the duly-certified verdict of the coroner's jury
as to the alleged suicide of deceased was not admissible. The statutes pre-
scribing the coroner's duties are construed as making him a conservator of the
peace and the purpose of his inquisitions to furnish the foundation for a crimi-
nal trial where the death is shown to be felonious. As no judicial powers are
conferred on the coroner by statute, the inquest proceedings are extra-judicial
and not admissible as evidence to prove suicide., The English rule admitting
such evidence is based on purely historical grounds and should not prevail
over the injury to public policy which would result from the attempt to
corruptly influence the inquests if such testimony were admitted. The Illinois
cases, under statutes similar to those of Colorado, declare such evidence ad-
missible. See, also, Walther v. Ins. Co., 65 Col. 417, 4 Pac. 413; Ins. Co. v.
Newton, 22 Wall. 32. Campbell, J., concurring specially, asserts the admissi-
bility of such testimony, citing especially the common law and Illinois rule.
Bills and Notes-Liability of Parties-Oral Testimony.-Shuey v.
Adair, 51 Pac. Rep. (Wash.) 388. An agreement between the maker, payee
and indorser of a negotiable note, that the payee shall look to the indorser and
not to the maker for payment, cannot be proved by oral evidence in order to
relieve the maker of his responsibility. The qases on this point are in appar-
ent and bewildering conflict, and many of them seem at first sight to sustain
the admissibility of such testimony. But the cases where such evidence is
rightly admitted fall within one of three principles, viz.: (i) Where the check
or order drawn by the agent discloses the principal, see Brockway v. Allen,
17 Wend. 4o; Whitneyv. Wyman, 1oz U. S. 392; Hilly. Ely, 9 Am. Dec.
376; Cragin v. Lovell, 109 U. S. 194, 3 Sup. Ct. 132, and cases there re-
viewed; (2) where there is enough on the face of the written instrument to
render it doubtful whether it was the intention to bind the agent or the prin-
cipal, see Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria v. Bank of Columbia, 5 Wheat.
326; Michels v. Olnstead, 14 Fed. 219; Metcalfv. Williams, 104 U. S. 93;
Kean v. Davis, 21 N. J. Law 683; Mechem, Ag. § 449; and, (3) where the in-
strument was to be delivered upon the taking effect of some future stipulated
condition, and it has been delivered before such condition is performed, see
Small v. Smith, i Denio. 583; Bank v. Lucknow, (Minn.), 35 N. W. 434;
Westeman v. Krumweide, (Minn.), I5 N. W. 255. As a matter of course
the defense of fraud or mistake is always available, see Hill v. Ely, sufira,
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and Small v. Smith, sup ra. As casting some light upon the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States on the point, and its construction of the
Pennsylvania cases, which are concededly the cases which support the admissi-
bility of this sort of testimony, see Bust v. Bank, ioi U. S. 93.
Action for Services-Inconifetency as a Defense-Rebuttal Evidence.-
State (Continental Match Co., prosecutor) v. Smith, 38 Ati. Rep. (N. J.) 969.
Plaintiff, an artisan, brought a suit for breach of a contract of employment,
the defense being incompetency, justifying his discharge. The lower court
admitted evidence showing plaintiff's unsatisfactory work in another factory.
To the claim that such admission was erroneous on the ground that the acts
done in another place were res inter alios act&e, the court held such evidence to
be admissible. See Brierly v. Mills, 128 Mass. 291.
Carriers-Injury to Passengers-Evidence-Statements of Plaintiff.-
West Chicago St. Ry. Co. v. Kennelly, 48 N. E. (Ill.) 996. The testimony of
a witness in an action for personal injury that the plaintiff "complained" of
her injury the morning after the accident is not inadmissible as being a decla-
ration in interest, but is admissible as a mere exclamation. But a statement
by the same witness that plaintiff "complained of her side. and under the
spine, in the back and this ankle," the morning after the accident, is not com.
petent, because the statements of the plaintiff may have been made with a view
to future litigation, and therefore declarations in interest. Statements of pain
and suffering, past and present, are inadmissible in an action for personal in-
juries unless made to a physician or medical expert for the purpose of treat-
ment or other legitimate purposes, or are made at the time of the injury so as
to form part of the res gesta (Railroad Co. v. Sutton, 42 Ill. 40; Quafe v.
Railway Co., 28 Wis. 524),
TAXATION.
City Lots-Assessments for Street Imfrovements-Election of Remedies.
- City of Cincinnati v. Emerson, 48 N. E. Rep. (Ohio) 667. An owner of a
city lot, who has two grounds for contesting the validity of an assessment im-
posed thereon for street improvements, one of which is common to him and
the abutting owners of other lots, and the other pertains to his lot only,
and who elects to bring an action enjoining the collection of the assessment in
his and the abutting owners' behalf, is deemed to have waived the right to
bring an action on the ground which pertained to his lot alone. A judgment
rendered under the first action refusing the relief sought is a bar to the second
action, even though the first action, if maintained, would have defeated the
assessment altogether, while the second action, if successful, would have
merely reduced the assessment against the one particular lot.
Privilege Tax-Exemfition-Class and SAecial Legislation-Motion of
Legislature.-Knoxville &- 0. R. Co. v. Harris, Comvptroller, 43 S. W.
Rep. (Tenn.) 115. A statute-Acts 1895 (Ex. Sess.), p. 592, c. 4, § 7-provid-
ing that 'specified corporations should pay specified taxes on specified privi-
leges, and among them railroad companies, not paying an ad valorem tax to
the State, discloses an obvious intention of the assembly to treat as a tax
privilege the business of the railroad and not the abstract condition of "not
paying an ad valorehz tax to the State." Such a tax is not objectionable
class legislation, in that there are only two such companies, because it applies
equally to all corporations in a similar condition, and makes a natural and
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reasonable classification. Neither can the validity of the tax be attacked on
the ground that the motive in passing the act was to deprive the railroads of
their advantage of exemption from ad valorem taxation. Also, that a com-
pany's charter provides "that its capital stock, the dividends thereon, and the
road and fixtures, depots, etc., shall be forever exempt from taxation, pro-
vided the stock or dividends, when the dividends exceed legal interest, may
be subject to taxation in common with money at interest, but no tax shall be
imposed so as to reduce dividends below legal interest," does not exempt such
company from privilegktaxation.
Taxation-Railroad Machine Shop.- Western N. Y. 6- Pa. R. Co. v.
Venango County, 38 At1. Rep. (Pa. zo88). Held, in an action to enjoin the
collection of taxes, that a machine shop belonging to a railroad company, and
used exclusively for repairs in its own business, is not subject to local taxation.
Case of East Pa. R. Co., x Wash. (Pa.) 428. distinguished. The test is
whether the property under discussion is used exclusively in the distinct and
direct furtherance of the object for which the charter of the company was
granted.
Inheritance Tax- Validity- Estates Previously Probated.-Gels-
thorfie, County Treasurer, v. Furnell, et al., 51 Pac. Rep. (Mont.) 267. An
inheritance tax is not void in so far as it applies to estates probated, but not
distributed until after it comes into effect. Although the privileges and
rights of heirs and legatees to take and receive shares of the property of a de-
cedent are vested immediately upon the death of the testator or intestate (see
See. 1794, Civ. Code); yet the term "vested rights" should not beset up as "a
shield of protection" against all considerations designed by the legislature to
promote the general welfare, or establish an advanced public policy for the
State. Cooley, Const. Lim., p. 437. The right, moreover, is subject to the
control of the courts for distribution and is dependent upon the laws for its
protection. See Carjfenter v. Com., 17 How. 456; Sutccession of Oyer, 6 Rob.
(La.) 504; Succession of Deyraud, 9 Rob. (La.) 357.
TRADE-MARKS.
Trade-Mark-Geografhical Name- Unfair Comfietition.-Gage-Downs
Co. v. Featherbone Corset Co., 83 Fed. Rep. 813. A Chicago manufacturer,
who for years has made corset waists and sold them as " Chicago Waists,"
until the goods under such name have become known to the trade as the
goods made by him, may enjoin another in a different city and State from sell-
ing his goods as "Chicago Waists." The appropriation of the name of the
place where goods are manufactured is not often protected, but where by the
use of the name it has acquired a secondary signification, as a mark denoting
the manufacturer rather than the place where the goods are made, and it is
the manifest intent of the adverse user to derive advantage from the reputa-
tion the goods thus branded have attained in the market, it will be enjoined.
Trade Marks and Trade Names-Labels of Laborers' Union.-Hetter-
man et al., v. Powers et al., 43 S. W. Rep. (Ky.) x8o. That the members of
certain voluntary trade unions of cigar makers are not strictly "in &siness"
for themselves, but are employed for wages in producing cigars to which they
have attached labels indicating such cigars to be the exclusive product of their
labor, is no defense to an action brought to restrain others from using these
labels. There is nothing objectionable in such labels, as denouncing other
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makes of cigars than union-made ones, in that the organization which
makes the cigars upon which the labels are placed is described as "opposed
to inferior, rat-shop, coolie, prison, or filthy tenement house workmanship."
The decisions on the question of the validity of such labels are not uniform.
Opposed to enjoining the infringement are Werner v. Brayton (Mass. 1896)
25 N. E. 46; Union v. Conhaim, 40 Minn. 243, 41 N. W. 943; Mc Vey v. Bun-
del, 144 Pa. St. 235, 22 Atl. 912; Schneider v. Williams, 44 N. J. Eq. 391, 14
Ati. 812. Sustaining the validity of the labels as "trade-marks," see Strasser
v. iMfoonelis, 55 N. Y. Super. Ct. (affirmed, 15 N. E. 730); Cohn v. Peofle, 149
Ill. 4 86, 37 N. E. 60. See also State v. Hagen, 6 Ind. App. 169, 33 N. E. 223;
Carson v. Ury, 39 Fed. 777. In a number of States-and in Kentucky, since
this case arose-statutes have recently been passed recognizing the right of
of wage earners to organize and select appropriate symbols to designate the
results of their handiwork.
MISCELLANEOUS.
Bank-Acting as Agent-Liabiliy.-Pegorday v. Citizens' National
Bank of Latrobe, 38 Atl. Rep. (Pa.) io3o. Plaintiff entrusted defendant
national bank with several shares of railroad stock, to be forwarded by them
and sold according to his direction by the bank's brokers. The stock was sold
and the broker's check forwarded to the bank which instantly placed the
amount to the credit of the plaintiff. Meanwhile the brokers had failed, and
the bank having forwarded the check it was returned protested. Defendant
thereupon charged back to the plaintiff the amount of the check, and the
plaintiff, having overdrawn his account according to the latter accounting, sues
the bank for the balance due him according to the first accounting, Held,
that plaintiff could recover. A national bank in buying or selling stock exer-
cises no function pertaining to it as a bank. In this case it was a voluntary
action on the part of the bank and having assumed the liability of an agent it
was subject to the rules governing that relation. In applying the amount of
the check to the plaintiff's credit they acted voluntarily and were liable for any
loss arising therefrom. Paul v. Ginn, 165 Pa. St. 139, 30 AtI. Rep. 721.
Judge Mitchell, dissenting, based his opinion on the ground that the relation
existing between the defendant and plaintiff was that of bank and depositor
rather than that of principal and agent.
Divorce-Adul/ery-Condonation.-Gorser v. Gorser, 38 Atl. Rep. (Pa.)
ox5. In an action for divorce by a husband it was shown that the wife had
committed various improprieties which she had admitted to him, but denied
actual guilt. Thereupon he had accepted her explanation but had never co-
habited with her afterwards. Proof of her guilt after that time having been
established, it was held by the court that such previous condonation would not
prevent the decree from 'being granted.
A.fifieal-.New Trial-Sur5rise.-A llen v. Chambers et al., 51 Pac. Rep.
(Wash.) 478. The surprise contemplated by the statute as a ground for a new
trial must relate to a matter of fact, and not of law; but where it is shown
that appellants neglected to introduce material evidence shown by their affi-
davits to be in their possession, relying on a ruling of the supreme court de-
claring such testimony not necessary for their view of the case, which ruling
was apparently directly overthrown by a subsequent decision of the court,
rendered after appellants' case had been submitted to the trial judge, a new
trial will be granted. See Starhweather v. Loomis, 2 Vt. 573.
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Criminal Law-Murder-Insane Delusions-Instructions.-PefiPe v.
Hubert, 5z Pac. Rep. (Cal.) 329. An instruction was given in a murder trial
enumerating and setting out the special beliefs which the defense claimed
constituted the insane delusion or monomania which impelled the defendant
to commit the homicide, and the jury were told that if the defendant enter-
tained such beliefs, and they were unsound, existing only in his imagination,
then they were insane delusions, as a matter of law. Held, error. There is
no such rule of law: matters of science must always be proven, and are
treated as matters of fact, and the court should not instruct in regard to them.
That these matters are discussed in legal treatises or judicial opinions does
not convert them into propositions of law.
Constitutional Law-Police Regulations-Restrictions on Interstate
Commerce-Inspection of Sheefi- Validity of Statute.-State v. Duckworth,
51 Pac. Rep. (Idaho) 456. Section 14 (Sess. Laws, 1895, p. 125), and Sections 4
and 6 (Sess. Laws, 1897, p. iT1), amendatory thereof, known as the "Scab
Laws," concerning the appointment of a sheep inspector, his fees for inspec-
tion, etc., and declaring it unlawful to bring sheep into the State unless they
have first been inspected and dipped as provided by these acts, are repugnant
to Section 8, Article I., of the Federal Constitution, relating to the regulation of
commerce. They place an unnecessary burden and restriction upon interstate
-commerce and are not a valid exercise of the police power, as interpreted in
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. i. Said sections also discriminate against non-
resident sheep owners in favor of resident owners to an extent repugnant to
the Federal Constitution, Section 2, Article IV. The case is distinguished from
those involving the constitutionality of what are known as "Texas Fever"
statutes. Texas cattle are the natural habitat of the latter disease, while it is
conceded that Idaho sheep are no more free from the "scab" than the sheep of
other States. But see, for a "Texas Fever" decision, R. R. Co. v. Husen, 95
U. S. 465. Compare Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 1o Sup. Ct. 862.
Defective Highways-Proximate Cause.-Davis v. Inhabitants of Long-
meadow, 48 N. E. Rep. (Mass.) 774. Plaintiff's team became mired in the
highway and while in the efforts and under the strain of getting it out, one of
the horses burst a blood vessel and soon after died. Held, that if the driver
reasonably thought he could get through the mud hole, and, exercising due
care, made reasonable efforts to extricate the team therefrom, the bursting
of the blood vessel and the horse's death were the direct and immediate con-
sequence of the defect in the road.
